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NO STRICT EVIDENCE RULES IN LABOR
AND EMPLOYMENT ARBITRATION
Michael Z. Greent
Since arbitrators are not bound by the strict rules of evidence applicable in
court, there originally developed a practice of admitting hearsay "for what it is
worth.' As various texts and many arbitrators have stated, 'Rarely do the par-
ties know what it is worth, at least not at the hearing.' I would add, nor in the
preparation of their briefs. As far back as 1967 a prominent group of arbitra-
tors concluded: 'Unless corroborated by truth-tending circumstances in the en-
vironment in which it is uttered, it (hearsay) is unreliable evidence and should
be received with mounting skepticism of its probative value as it becomes
more remote and more filtered.' This statement strengthened the underpin-
nings of the practice of receiving hearsay, but limiting its probative value. It is
reflected, e.g., in the following comment on the 'for what it is worth,' if any-
thing, concept: In accepting it, however, the arbitrator is expected to have the
expertise and experience to properly evaluate the evidence and to accord it the
appropriate weight dependent upon the corroborating circumstances sur-
rounding it.'
I. INTRODUCTION 2
The quote at the beginning of this Essay, from an arbitration deci-
sion issued by arbitrator Stanley Kravit, highlights the difficulties that
advocates in both labor arbitration3 and employment arbitration4 ex-
t Professor of Law and Associate Dean for Faculty Research & Development,
Texas Wesleyan University School of Law. I would like to thank the members of the
Texas Wesleyan Law Review who coordinated the conference on February 13, 2009,
where this Essay was presented, "Alternative Dispute Resolution: Exploring the new
standard of diligent settlement advocacy facing today's litigators." Also, I am grateful
for the research assistance provided by LaJoi Murray and Keri Ward and the financial
assistance provided by the Texas Wesleyan University student research assistant
program.
1. Barton Center, 121 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 249, 253 (2005) (Kravit, Arb.) (cita-
tions omitted).
2. Initially, the Author must highlight that while this Essay was in draft form, he
became aware of a pending publication that is very helpful in bringing forth some of
the issues highlighted herein. The Author commends it to you for reading as it was
published shortly before the presentation that resulted in this Essay. Edwin R.
Render, The Rules of Evidence in Labor Arbitration, 54 Loy. LA. L. REV. 297 (2008).
3. Labor arbitration typically results as a final step in a grievance process for
resolving disputes under a collective bargaining agreement between an employer and
a union representing the employees of that employer. See Russell G. Pearce, The
Union Lawyer's Obligation to Bargaining Unit Members: A Case Study of the Interde-
pendence of Legal Ethics and Substantive Law, 37 S. TEX. L. REV. 1095, 1100 n.23
(1996). Labor arbitration has been in existence for many years and goes back as far as
the early part of last century. Dennis R. Nolan & Roger I. Abrams, The Labor Arbi-
trator's Several Roles, 44 MD. L. REV. 873, 873-75 (1985) (discussing the role of labor
arbitrators as labor arbitration has evolved since the early 1900s and with further key
developments at the time of the Second World War and early 1960s); see also LAURA
J. COOPER ET AL., ADR IN THE WORKPLACE 6-15 (2d ed. 2005) (describing the early
development of labor arbitration).
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perience regarding evidentiary rulings. As an evidence law professor
and a labor and employment arbitrator, I have examined the complex-
ity in applying the rules of evidence in an arbitration setting. My
experience and research revealed a clear need to identify the appro-
priate considerations when applying the rules of evidence in arbitra-
tion proceedings. Both advocates and arbitrators can benefit from
this clarity.
II. ARBITRATION OR BENCH TRIALS: ARE EVIDENCE RULES
UNNECESSARY WITHOUT A JURY?
Whether an arbitrator applies the rules of evidence usually depends
on whether the parties have contractually agreed to do so. 6 Some
commentators have already explored the propriety of applying the
rules of evidence when there is no jury, as in a bench trial.7 As a noted
commentator on arbitration, Thomas Carbonneau has explained:
"The arbitral hearing is not unlike a bench trial in which the absence
of a jury alleviates the need for elaborate rule frameworks through
4. Employment arbitration typically results as an agreement between an em-
ployer and an individual employee to have their future employment disputes resolved
by binding arbitration when imposed by the employer on the employee as a condition
of employment. See David S. Schwartz, Mandatory Arbitration and Fairness, 84 NO-
TRE DAME L. REV. 1247 (2009). Employment arbitration is a relatively new method
of dispute resolution compared to labor arbitration because employment arbitration
only really arrived on the scene over the last two decades after the Supreme Court's
1991 decision in Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20 (1991). See
generally Richard Bales, Normative Consideration of Employment Arbitration at Gil-
mer's Quinceafiera, 81 TUL. L. REV. 331 (2006) (discussing the development of em-
ployment arbitration law since Gilmer in 1991); Thomas E. Carbonneau, The
Revolution in Law Through Arbitration, 56 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 233, 257-58 (2008)
(describing the evolution of employment arbitration under the FAA as one of the
"new forms of arbitration"); American Arbitration Association, Employment Arbi-
tration Rules and Mediation Procedures (effective June 1, 2009), available at http://
www.adr.org/sp.asp?id=32904 (explaining how the American Arbitration Association
which has existed since 1926 did not establish employment arbitration rules until June
1996 and only after the Due Process Protocol was developed by individuals represent-
ing various constituencies including labor, management, employment, civil rights, pri-
vate administrative agencies, government, and the American Arbitration Association
in 1995 to discuss a fair process to arbitrate employment claims after the courts
opened the door to enforce employment arbitration agreements in the early 1990s).
5. The Federal Rules of Evidence are the primary rules of evidence referred to
herein. See generally FED. R. EVID. 101-1103; CHRISTOPHER B. MUELLER & LAIRD
C. KIRKPATRICK, EVIDENCE UNDER THE RULES: TEXT, CASES, AND PROBLEMS 3 n.2
(6th ed. 2008) (listing the forty states that have developed evidence rules based upon
the federal rules of evidence).
6. See Michael L. Moffitt, Customized Litigation: The Case for Making Civil Pro-
cedure Negotiable, 75 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 461, 473 (2007); see also Laird C. Kirkpat-
rick, Scholarly and Institutional Challenges to the Law of Evidence: From Bentham to
the ADR Movement, 25 Loy. L.A. L. REV. 837, 847-850 (1992).
7. See, e.g., Frederick Schauer, On The Supposed Jury-Dependence of Evidence
Law, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 165, 165-66, 166 n.3 (2006) (addressing the question of
whether there should be rules of evidence if there is no jury).
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which information is filtered."' Because arbitration proceedings and
bench trials are similar - as contrasted with jury trials9 - the analysis
involving application of evidence rules during a bench trial provides
an excellent analytical tool to assess the use of the rules of evidence in
arbitration.
The rules of evidence focus primarily on preventing juries from be-
ing swayed by certain types of evidence." Professor Frederick
Schauer has noted that in most other countries where a jury trial right
is in decline or is not available, the law of evidence does not really
exist." This finding supports the proposition that the existence of a
jury represents a significant aspect in the development and need for
compliance with evidence rules. Other scholars have also asserted that
the goals of exclusionary evidence rules do not have the same value or
need for application when there is no jury to consider.1 Accordingly,
8. Carbonneau, supra note 4, at 243 n.39.
9. See generally Christopher R. Drahozal, A Behavioral Analysis of Private Judg-
ing, 67 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 105, 130-31 (2004); Dianne LaRocca, The Bench
Trial: A More Beneficial Alternative to Arbitration of Title VII Claims, 80 CHI.-KENT
L. REV. 933, 957 (2005).
10. See Todd E. Pettys, The Immoral Application of Exclusionary Rules, 2008 Wis.
L. REV. 463. 464-66 (2008) (noting mistrust of jurors as a primary motivation for
evidentiary exclusionary rules); Schauer, supra note 7, at 168 (noting the position
taken by some scholars that "most of the exclusionary [evidence] rules are designed
with the jury in mind and with the goal of increasing the accuracy and efficiency of
fact finding under circumstances of jury decision making"). But see Dale A. Nance,
The Best Evidence Principle, 73 IOWA L. REV. 227, 229-30 (1988) (finding that some
scholarship asserts that the purpose of evidence rules was not for the control of juries
but for the control of lawyers which supports why the rules are still used in bench
trials); Judith Resnik, Managerial Judges, 96 HARV. L. REV. 374, 408 n.137 (1982)
(noting that the "rules of evidence are designed to screen extraneous information
from decision makers, but the rules are often applied less rigorously in bench than at
jury trials"). Although outside the scope of this Essay, there are certainly a number
of concerns about whether judges in bench trials who exclude certain pieces of evi-
dence under the rules of evidence can still be able to act effectively as the decision
maker when they are aware of the excluded evidence. See, e.g., Laura I. Appleman,
The Lost Meaning of the Jury Trial Right, 84 IND. L.J. 397, 443-44 (2009) (arguing that
federal bench trials should be disbanded altogether and any notion that judges can
divorce themselves from hearing excluded evidence is a myth); see also Jennifer L.
Mnookin, Response, Bifurcation and the Law of Evidence, 155 U. PA. L. REV. PEN-
NUMBRA 134, 134-35 (2006), http://www.pennumbra.com/responses/12-2006/
Mnookin.pdf (discussing studies showing that judges have just as much difficulty ig-
noring inadmissible evidence as do jurors, except for when it involves a constitutional
issue such as a suppressed search or improper confession).
11. Schauer, supra note 7, at 174-75.
12. See Kenneth Culp Davis, Hearsay in Nonjury Cases, 83 HARV. L. REV. 1362,
1363 (1970) (asserting that there is little need for evidence rules in bench trials); Ken-
neth Culp Davis, An Approach to the Rules of Evidence for Nonjury Cases, 50 A.B.A.
J. 723 (1964) (asserting that evidence rules should not apply in bench trials or nonjury
proceedings); Comment, Exclusionary Rules of Evidence in Non-Jury Proceedings, 46
ILL. L. REV. 915, 923-25 (1952); Note, The Theoretical Foundation of the Hearsay
Rules, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1786, 1804-05 (1980) (noting that the hearsay rule exclusion
is aimed at controlling juries' use of evidence to make certain inferences). Contra
Eleanor Swift, Abolishing the Hearsay Rule, 75 CAL. L. REV. 495, 518-19 (1987) (as-
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when arbitration occurs, as with bench trials, the need for strict com-
pliance with the rules of evidence is obviated by the fact that there is
no jury to be shielded from certain types of evidence.
III. BALANCING ARBITRATION CONCERNS WITH USING STRICT
EVIDENCE RULES
In the arbitration process, there is ongoing tension between the
need for the process to be informal and the need for some structure
and clarity in how evidence will be admitted and evaluated. In gen-
eral, the need for informality in arbitration has led to the belief that
the application of the rules of evidence should not operate as a "strait-
jacket" as arbitrators should be allowed to "receive any evidence 'for
what it is worth."' 13 However, this approach of allowing all evidence
in by taking it for what it is worth has also led advocates to complain
that they have "no guidance as to whether the arbitrator considers the
evidence relevant and, if so, the weight it will receive."14 Essentially,
arbitrators need to balance concerns about informality, lack of legal
therapeutic value, difficulties in obtaining witnesses, lack of legal rep-
resentation, and the complexities of workplace disputes with the prin-
ciples of supporting the evidence rules that exclude certain forms of
evidence as unreliable or because of policy reasons.
For example, it has been argued that because of the therapeutic
value of arbitration as a form of workplace dispute resolution, em-
ployees should be allowed to have some voice by telling their story
even if it involves some aspects of information that would be excluded
serting that the hearsay rules support the general concept of fact finding whether by
judge or jury by requiring proponents of evidence to provide sufficient foundation
witnesses with live testimony rather than allowing parties to flood the proceedings
with hearsay); Schauer, supra note 7, at 198-99 (asserting that if distrust of jurors'
cognitive abilities is the reason for excluding evidence, similar concerns should apply
to judges and these concerns may help explain why the rules of evidence still apply as
a whole even in a non-jury trial proceeding); Andrew J. Wistrich et. al., Can Judges
Ignore Inadmissible Information? The Difficulty of Deliberately Disregarding, 153 U.
PA. L. REV. 1251, 1323 (2005) (finding that judges are just as swayed as jurors by the
items that the rules of evidence tend to exclude); Mnookin, supra note 10, at 135-139
(calling for bifurcation where one judge rules on admission of evidence and another
evaluates it because judges have difficulties in completely devaluing evidence that has
been excluded under the rules since they have heard it and have to go through the
process of "unringing the bell").
13. Render, supra note 2, at 299-300. I was presented this very argument a couple
of years ago while at training for labor arbitrators who are members of the National
Labor Arbitration Panel for the American Arbitration Association. At this training
session, advocates for both employers and unions complained that one of their pet
peeves was that arbitrators do not give them guidance by actually ruling on their
evidentiary objections.
14. Id. at 300 & n.6 (asserting that the confusion amongst advocates based upon
the take it for what it is worth approach leads them to feel that they must "'throw in
the kitchen sink' in order to assure themselves that they are introducing all the evi-
dence on a point that the arbitrator might later consider significant" and can "lead to
lengthy, contentious, and confused hearings").
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under the rules of evidence.15 However, this therapeutic value should
also be balanced with the arbitrator's obligation to provide a fair and
efficient hearing to all parties. The arbitrator should not allow all
forms of evidence merely for its therapeutic value when this action
could be perceived as acting with partiality to one side or to the arbi-
trator who benefits by receiving more compensation by extending the
time for the hearing. 1
6
Also, the fact that the advocates for the parties, or even the arbitra-
tor, are more likely to not be lawyers familiar with the rules of evi-
dence represents another reason to not apply the strict formalities of
the rules of evidence in arbitration. 7 The strict application of the rules
of evidence to pro se parties may prevent the true story from being
told. Under federal arbitration law, one of the narrow exceptions al-
lowed to overturn an arbitrator's award includes failure to allow a full
hearing on evidentiary matters. 18 If strict application of the rules of
evidence were applied to parties without lawyers, they may be denied
a fair hearing.
To the extent that a witness is needed for cross examination under
the rules of evidence, that concern should also be balanced with the
15. Id. at 302-04 nn.15-23, 306 (providing arguments that strict application of the
rules of evidence is "inimical to the purpose of arbitration" as it prevents "witnesses
in an arbitration from 'getting things off their chest'" in arbitration, the parties have
an "expectation that their story will unfold without the need to worry over common
exclusionary gambits invoked by advocates in a courtroom" and strict application of
evidence rules "has a chilling effect, preventing lay witnesses from simply telling their
stories as they understand them") (citations omitted); Kirkpatrick, supra note 6. at
844 n.41 (noting that "arbitrators sometimes allow clearly irrelevant evidence as a
form of catharsis for the parties to the dispute" and arbitrators acknowledge "the
necessity of listening to irrelevant matter when it serves to release pent up emotions"
because allowing an employee "his day in court and being able to tell the other side
exactly what is on his mind may be as important to a disputant as winning a case"); see
also United Steelworkers of Am. v. Am. Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564, 568 (1960) (finding
that in labor arbitration, "even frivolous claims may have therapeutic values of which
those who are not a part of the plant environment may be quite unaware"). The
arbitrator's obligation to provide a fair hearing is also required as an ethical obliga-
tion. Render, supra note 2, at 299 n.2 (describing the requirement under the Labor
Arbitrator's Code of Professional Responsibility that the arbitrator "provide for a fair
and adequate hearing which assures that both parties have sufficient opportunity to
present their respective evidence and argument").
16. See Reginald Alleyne, Delawyerizing Labor Arbitration, 50 OHIO ST. L.J. 93,
100 (1989); see also Marvin F. Hill, Jr. & Tammy M. Westhoff, "I'll Take It For What it
is Worth"-The Use of Hearsay Evidence by Labor Arbitrators: A Primer and Mod-
est Proposal, 1998 J. Disi. RESOL. 1, 34-35 (1998) (noting that it is of no benefit to
allow everything to be admitted for what it is worth in arbitration as it sends the
wrong message to the advocates through its ambiguity and requires that the advocates
repeatedly object at every point further in the proceeding to preserve the record).
17. Hill & Westhoff, supra note 16, at 9.
18. See Marvin F. Hill, Jr. & Tammy Westhoff, "No Song Unsung, No Wine Un-
tasted"-Employee Addictions, Dependencies, and Post-Discharge Rehabilitation: An-
other Look at the Victim Defense in Labor Arbitration, 47 DRAKE L. REv. 399, 438
(1999) (discussing the propriety of erring on the side of admitting evidence instead of
being overturned for failing to allow certain evidence to be heard).
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fact that it is much more difficult for the parties to subpoena witnesses
to attend the arbitration process than a court proceeding related to a
workplace dispute. 19 In some instances arbitrators have found that
"hearsay is the only evidence available in the workplace setting, and
the automatic exclusion of same could result in an incomplete record
and a failure to accomplish a just result."2
Regardless of the concerns that the evidentiary rules need to ad-
dress, another major concern with strict enforcement is that courts will
likely not review an erroneous evidence exclusion even if it affects the
outcome of the case. Enforcement of labor arbitration agreements has
traditionally been resolved under Section 301 of the Taft-Hartley, La-
bor Management Relations Act (Section 301).21 The primary method
for enforcing employment arbitration agreements occurs pursuant to
the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA).22 Whether enforcement occurs
under Section 301 or the FAA, courts tend to defer to an arbitrator's
decision making in order to enforce the parties' agreement to have
their dispute resolved in arbitration.23
19. Hill & Westhoff, supra note 16, at 30 ("[P]arties to an arbitration hearing do
not have the ability to subpoena witnesses and must utilize the witnesses and evidence
they can conjure up on their own accord. The arbitrator must be able to fill in any
gaps with his own good judgment, and hearsay evidence is frequently that fil-
ter."); Render, supra note 2, at 316 (finding that there will be situations in workplace
disputes where the parties may find it extremely difficult to get first-hand witnesses,
the arbitrator may still apply the reasons for the evidentiary rules to decide whether
to accept testimony without first-hand witnesses and what weight to give to it).
20. Hill & Westhoff, supra note 16, at 30 & n.135 (citation omitted).
21. 29 U.S.C. § 185 (2006); see also Textile Workers Union of Am. v. Lincoln Mills
of Ala., 353 U.S. 448, 451, 455 (1957) (finding that Section 301 established federal
common law regarding enforcement of collective bargaining agreement arbitration
provisions). In 1960, in three cases collectively referred to as the Steelworker's tril-
ogy, the Supreme Court further explained the importance to the collective bargaining
labor process of the federal policy favoring arbitration and enforcement of arbitration
agreements. See United Steelworkers of Am. v. Am. Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564, 567-68
(1960); United Steelworkers of Am. v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574,
578-81 (1960); United Steelworkers of Am. v. Enter. Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S.
593, 596-97 (1960).
22. 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-15 (2006); see also Preston v. Ferrer, 128 S. Ct. 978, 981 (2008)
(reiterating that the FAA has broad and preemptive authority in enforcement of arbi-
tration agreements); Equal Employment Opportunity Comm'n v. Waffle House, Inc.,
534 U.S. 279, 287-88 (2002) (discussing broad enforcement of agreements to arbitrate
statutory employment discrimination claims under the FAA but finding those agree-
ments do not prevent the EEOC from suing an employer in court since the EEOC is a
prosecuting agency not a party to such agreements); Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Ad-
ams, 532 U.S. 105, 109 (2001) (establishing that employment agreements to arbitrate
statutory employment discrimination claims as a condition of employment are gener-
ally enforceable under the FAA except for a narrow exception applying only to trans-
portation workers); Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20 (1991)
(establishing the enforcement of an agreement to arbitrate a statutory employment
discrimination claim).
23. For labor arbitration, see Carbonneau, supra note 4, at 253, 253-54 n.83
(describing the court's deference to the arbitrator's award under the common law and
Section 301). See, e.g., United Paperworkers Int'l Union, AFL-CIO v. Misco, Inc.,
484 U.S. 29, 36-39 (1987); Major League Baseball Players Ass'n v. Garvey, 532 U.S.
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This deferential standard essentially removes any judicial review of
an arbitrator's evidentiary rulings as a matter of law.24 The courts
tend to find that the parties in arbitration have submitted their resolu-
tion to an arbitrator "they trust, and it is for the arbitrators to deter-
mine the weight and credibility of evidence ... presented . . . without
504, 505 (2001) (per curiam); E. Associated Coal Corp. v. United Mine Workers of
Am., 531 U.S. 57, 62-63 (2000). For employment arbitration, the Supreme Court has
not addressed specific standards for enforcement of an arbitrator's award in employ-
ment arbitration, but the lower courts have developed deferential standards pursuant
to the FAA. See Cynthia L. Estlund, Between Rights and Contract: Arbitration Agree-
ments and Non-Compete Covenants as a Hybrid Form of Employment Law, 155 U.
PA. L. REV. 379, 397-98 (2006) (describing the doctrine of enforcing the agreement to
arbitrate employment disputes as long as the employee may "effectively vindicate" his
employment claim and how this doctrine arose as a creature of the court's application
of the FAA to allow statutory claims to be arbitrated); Carbonneau, supra note 4, at
248 & n.62 (describing the limited bases for challenging an arbitrator's award under
Section 10 of the FAA). Also, under FAA jurisprudence, the theory of manifest disre-
gard of the law in employment arbitration allows an arbitrator's award to be over-
turned if the arbitrator knew the law was clear on the subject and still chose to
disregard it. See, e.g., Halligan v. Piper Jaffray, Inc., 148 F.3d 197, 204 (2d Cir. 1998);
see also, Carbonneau, supra note 4, at 242 n.33 (citing cases involving the "manifest
disregard of the law" as grounds for vacating an arbitrator's award and decision). The
United States Supreme Court decision in Hall Street Associates LLC. v. Mattel Inc.,
128 S. Ct. 1396 (2008), has called into question the continuing viability of the manifest
disregard of the law theory by unequivocally finding that only statutory grounds iden-
tified in the Federal Arbitration Act may be used to vacate an arbitration award. See
Christopher R. Drahozal & Quentin R. Wittrock, Is There a Flight From Arbitration?
37 HOFSTRA L. REV. 71, 105 n.164 (2008) (noting that some courts have found that
manifest disregard of the law, a common law theory, is no longer applicable after the
Hall Street decision because the Court specified that only statutory grounds may be
used to vacate arbitration awards); Justin Kelly, Confusion About "Manifest Disre-
gard" After Hall Street v. Mattel, 63 Disp. RESOL. J. 4 (2008) (describing the confu-
sion about manifest disregard of the law being in question after Hall Street because it
is a non-statutory ground for vacating an arbitrator's award and describing judicial
opinions that assert the theory is dead versus opinions that assert it still exists). Re-
gardless of the supposed death of manifest disregard of the law theory, the Author
cannot see how one might apply this doctrine to overturn an arbitrator's decision with
respect to an evidentiary ruling. Courts tend to provide judges some discretion with
evidentiary rulings and it would be difficult to show that the law was clear and the
arbitrator chose to ignore it in making an evidentiary ruling when many times
whatever the evidentiary ruling made by the judge will be correct. See Alleyne, supra
note 16, at 97 n.23 (noting that given the discretion involved in admitting evidence, it
is "virtually impossible for a trial judge in a nonjury case to commit reversible error
by receiving incompetent evidence") (citation omitted); Mnookin, supra note 10, at
140 (noting the discretion provided to judges in making evidentiary rulings and how
"there are enormous number of evidentiary determinations in which either answer
would be allowed - not only because of the harmless error doctrine, but because
neither judgment would be error at all").
24. Carbonneau, supra note 4, at 242 n.33 (identifying three narrow bases under
the common law for challenging an arbitrator's decision as manifest disregard of the
law, irrational determinations, and public policy violations); Hill & Westhoff, supra
note 16, at 17 (describing how courts have established that there is a deferential stan-
dard of review regarding an arbitrator's decision because "federal courts may not
second guess an arbitrator's interpretation of a collective bargaining agreement" in-
cluding "the arbitrator's rulings with respect to his views on hearsay and admissibility
of evidence").
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restrictions as to the rules of admissibility. '25 With this broad power
to make admissibility decisions, arbitrators should be careful in too
easily deciding to exclude evidence based upon application of the
rules of evidence given that a horrendous evidentiary ruling cannot be
changed through some judicial appeal.26
Furthermore, a particular arbitrator who may even be a lawyer may
not be well-steeped in the nuances and complexities of the rules of
evidence. Even judges who must apply these rules on a regular basis
may have difficulties, for example, in navigating the rule on hearsay
and its various exceptions,27 in applying the character evidence rules,
28
or in discerning the differences between impeachment by prior bad
acts not resulting in convictions versus impeachment by convictions.29
By placing too much focus on the rules of evidence, it takes away
from some of the key reasons that parties agree to pursue resolution
of their disputes through arbitration including informality, shorter
time, and less costs. If the rules of evidence had to be strictly applied,
this would make the arbitration process much more formalistic and it
would add to the time and expense of completing the process which
detracts from the purported benefits of arbitration.3 °
25. Hill & Westhoff, supra note 16, at 33 (citation omitted).
26. One of the few limited bases for challenging an arbitrator's decision under the
Federal Arbitration Act may arise when the arbitrator refuses to allow the parties to
present evidence. See 9 U.S.C. § 10(a)(3) (2006) (stating that one of the narrow bases
for challenging an arbitrator's decision and award includes "misconduct ... in refus-
ing to hear evidence pertinent and material to the controversy"). However, an arbi-
trator may be justified in excluding some evidence without violating the FAA. See,
e.g., Supreme Oil Co. v. Abondolo, 568 F. Supp. 2d 401, 407-409 (S.D.N.Y. 2008)
(finding that exclusion of employer's counsel from testifying did not warrant over-
turning the arbitrator's award under FAA Section 10 for refusal to allow pertinent
evidence because there were legitimate reasons to not allow the attorney to testify
and the employer could have obtained the same evidence without having the em-
ployer's counsel testify); see also Kirkpatrick, supra note 6, at 844 ("There is a greater
danger of inviting judicial challenge to the arbitration award where the arbitrator ad-
mits too little evidence rather than too much."); Hill & Westhoff, supra note 16, at
22-23, 22 nn.99-100 (describing a case where the court overturned the arbitrator's
decision pursuant to Section 10 of the FAA due to the arbitrator's "failure to consider
evidence presented" when the arbitrator misled an employer into believing that a
document was not hearsay when it was admitted for what it was worth and prevented
the employer from establishing on the record that the document fit a hearsay business
records exception and then in the decision the arbitrator "spent five pages of his deci-
sion in a diatribe on the unreliability of hearsay").
27. Compare FED. R. EvID. 801(a)-(c), 802, with id. 803-805, 807.
28. FED. R. EvID. 404-405; see also Peter Tillers, What is Wrong with Character
Evidence?, 49 HASTINGS L.J. 781, 783 (1998) (discussing the difficulties in understand-
ing the character evidence rules).
29. Compare FED. R. OF EvID. 608(b), with id. 609.
30. See Alleyne, supra note 16, at 107 (proposing complete abolition of objections
to documentary evidence at labor arbitrations and all objections to testimony, except
relevance and privilege objections, to make sure that arbitration maintains its benefits
of being a quick and informal resolution).
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IV. PRINCIPLES BEHIND THE RULES SHOULD STILL BE EMPLOYED
AND EXPLAINED
In some instances, the parties, especially their advocates, complain
that failure to literally apply the rules of evidence in arbitration makes
it very difficult to prepare. This complaint resonates with advocates
when an arbitrator's typical response to an objection based on the
rules of evidence has been: "I'll take it for what it's worth."'" Advo-
cates lose confidence in the fairness of the process and feel uncertain
about arbitration when arbitrators allow evidence that is hearsay or
prejudicial or in violation of some other evidentiary rule and say they
will take it for what it is worth.
If an advocate objects to the admission of a document on the basis
of hearsay and the arbitrator overrules the objection and merely says,
"I'll take it for what it's worth," the advocate still has no indication as
to whether the document will ultimately be considered as valid evi-
dence or dismissed as unreliable hearsay. The advocate must continue
to put forth other evidence to challenge the impact of the document
without knowing whether the initial hearsay objection will ultimately
carry the day on the matter. To the advocate, this uncertainty is
counterproductive to the goals of certainty along with the relatively
inexpensive costs and speed in choosing arbitration to resolve the
dispute.
In response to these concerns, arbitrators must say more than "I'll
take it for what it is worth."33 Instead, arbitrators should tell the par-
ties what he or she feels about the quality of the evidence based upon
the arguments presented. An arbitrator could say the following in re-
sponse to a hearsay objection: "Under the circumstances, this evi-
dence will be admitted. However, based upon the arguments
presented, this evidence will have little weight given its unreliability as
hearsay that appears to have no appropriate exception." With this
approach, the evidence is still admitted and considered by the arbitra-
tor. But the parties do get a feel for how to proceed thereafter rather
than first discovering the arbitrator's real view of the evidentiary ob-
jections in the written decision issued well after the hearing.
The arbitral process should encourage the parties that they must
provide the most reliable evidence they can. If the advocates only rely
on hearsay or other unreliable evidence or evidence that represents
31. See generally Hill & Westhoff, supra note 16, at 1-2; Schauer, supra note 7, at
166 & n.3 (finding that many judges in non-jury trials respond to evidentiary objec-
tions by stating: "I'll let it in and give it the weight it deserves" after hearing all the
evidence).
32. Hill & Westhoff, supra note 16, at 2 (noting that the arbitral process is not
served by admitting all evidence and "taking it for what it is worth" because absent
witnesses make testimony unreliable).
33. Alleyne, supra note 16, at 98 (noting that the finding by some arbitrators that
they will receive a document for what it's worth is a "somewhat meaningless
pronouncement").
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public policy concerns upon which the exclusionary rules of evidence
are based, the parties should know that the arbitrator will not think
highly of this evidence. However, the parties should not expect to give
or hear lip service regarding the arbitrator's obligation to strictly ad-
here to the rules when such a reality would not make practical sense
for labor and employment arbitration.34
By admitting and considering the evidence for its limited value and
communicating that to the parties, the arbitrator does not unnecessa-
rily exclude evidence based upon rote application of the rules of evi-
dence. The arbitrator also recognizes the underlying principles of
various rules of evidence and informs the parties of how those princi-
ples may guide the arbitrator in assessing the evidence presented dur-
ing the hearing." In adopting this approach, strict compliance with
the rules of evidence would not be a component of arbitration. But,
arbitrators could certainly apply the principles underlying the rules of
evidence and respond to thorough evidentiary objections made by the
parties' advocates by giving guidance as to how those principles will
shape the arbitrator's consideration of the evidence in issue at the
hearing.36 Then the benefits of informality, less costs, and certainty
34. Since arbitration occurs as a result of the parties' agreement, Kirkpatrick,
supra note 6, at 844 ("[P]arties can stipulate in the arbitration clause or submission
that the hearing be conducted pursuant to the formal rules of evidence."), the parties
could always make sure that the evaluation of the evidence and the determination of
which evidence should be heard by the evaluator could be bifurcated. Mnookin,
supra note 10, at 141-142. Although bifurcation would permit the two roles, ruler on
admissibility of evidence versus evaluator of evidence, to be kept separate, the addi-
tional time and costs involved in selecting and paying for a different person to take on
the second role would represent a great deterrence to arbitration's overall value as an
alternative to court resolution. See Schwartz, supra note 4, at 1326-27 (discussing
some of the purported benefits of arbitration in that "[i]t is generally assumed that
arbitration is faster and cheaper than litigation.")
35. See Kirkpatrick, supra note 6, at 847-50 (describing Jeremy Bentham's prefer-
ence for evidentiary principles rather than rules and how the ADR movement is an
expansion of that development because the principles behind the rules help give gui-
dance in evaluating the evidence); Eileen A. Scallen, Evidence Law as Pragmatic Le-
gal Rhetoric: Reconnecting Legal Scholarship, Teaching and Ethics, 21 QUINNIPIAc L.
REV. 813, 852 (2003) ("When arbitrators agree to hear evidence 'for what it's worth,'
one needs to be able to argue about what evidence is worth, which demands a deeper
understanding of the rationales and values, including epistemology, behind our rules
of Evidence, as much as checklists of foundational elements to introduce a docu-
ment.") (citation omitted); Michael S. Winograd, Rules of Evidence in Labor Arbitra-
tion, 55 Disp. RESOL. J. 45, 83-84 (2000) (describing how principles behind the rules
may be used in a limited way by an arbitrator but there should not be a strict applica-
tion of evidence rules in labor arbitration).
36. See Hill & Westhoff, supra note 16, at 34-35 (finding that "the arbitration
system is not well served by a rule that allows everything into the record" and there is
"no infirmity" in an arbitrator declaring at the hearing that out of court statements
made by witnesses who do not appear but corroborate other in-court testimony is
hearsay that does not carry the same weight as in-court testimony but it is still proba-
tive and worthy of serious consideration); Render, supra note 2, at 310 ("When an
arbitrator has a question about evidence being confusing or misleading, the arbitrator
should resolve that question at the hearing, if possible").
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can still be adequately achieved in arbitration while recognizing that
lack of judicial review, a focus on juror considerations, and the need
for flexibility demands that literal application of the rules of evidence
should not occur in labor and employment arbitration.
V. CONCLUSION
Allowing strict application of evidentiary rules could prevent the
parties from having a fair and effective hearing. Whether the parties
need informality along with the therapeutic opportunity to tell their
story or whether their advocates or the arbitrator are not sophisti-
cated in the nuances of the evidentiary rules, strict application of the
evidentiary rules would tend to be a harsh result. Furthermore, unlike
a judge in a jury or bench trial, when the arbitrator is asked to rule on
the legal aspects of the dispute including the law of evidence, there is
usually no appeal to a review court to determine whether erroneous,
but outcome-determinative, rulings should warrant overturning the
arbitrator's decision.
However, arbitrators should not just allow anything to be admitted
into evidence for what it is worth because this approach confuses the
advocates and adds unnecessary costs and delays to the arbitration
process. Instead, arbitrators need to strike an appropriate balance be-
tween letting everything in and strict application of the rules.
Arbitrators in labor and employment arbitration can provide con-
sistency by using the underlying principles behind the rules of evi-
dence as a tool to inform the parties at the hearing whether evidence
offered is not only going to be admitted but what weight the arbitrator
will give to it. Then the parties will have the guidance they need to
take advantage of the benefits of the arbitration process without being
subjected to unwieldy evidence expectations and uncertainty by being
informed that the arbitrator will only take it for whatever it is worth.
While not strictly applying the rules of evidence, the arbitrator will
still be able to benefit by offering a fair framework to achieve better
fact finding and evaluation of the evidence presented through an effi-
cient hearing.37
37. See Render, supra note 2, at 349-51.

